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Abstract 
There is now a large literature in neuroscience highlighting how some neurons respond 
highly selectively to high-level information (e.g., cells that respond to specific faces) and a 
growing literature in psychology and computer science showing that artificial neural 
networks often learn highly selective representations.  Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
neuroscientists reject ‘grandmother cell’ theories out of hand, and many psychologists reject 
localist models based on neuroscience.  In this review I detail some of the conceptual 
confusions regarding grandmother cells that have contributed to this state of affairs, and 
review the literature of single-unit recording studies in artificial neural networks that may 
provide insights into why some neurons respond in a highly selective manner.  I then briefly 
review the contributions from leading theorists in psychology and neuroscience.  My hope 
this special issue contributes to a more productive debate on an important issue that has often 
been characterized by misunderstandings between disciplines. 
 
Key words:  grandmother cells; localist representations; distributed representations; neural 
networks 
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Grandmother cells and localist representations:  A review of current thinking. 
 For over 30 years the distinction between localist vs. distributed coding has been 
central to theorizing in psychology (McClelland, Rumelhart, & PDP Research Group, 1986; 
Rumelhart, McClelland, & the PDP Research Group, 1986).  By contrast, the distinction 
between grandmother cells vs. distributed coding has been less central to theory in 
neuroscience, and indeed, the term ‘grandmother cell’ is somewhat pejorative, designed to 
highlight the absurdity of the hypothesis.  Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of high-
profile publications have highlighted the extremely selective firing of some neurons in 
humans, and a growing number of computational studies have shown that artificial neural 
networks learn highly selective representations as well.  This has led to a growing interest in 
grandmother cells (See Figure 1), but still, it remains the case that neuroscientists 
overwhelmingly dismiss the grandmother cell hypothesis, and attempts to link theory in 
psychology and neuroscience is often characterized by misunderstandings that have slowed 
theoretical progress in both disciplines. 
Why is the grandmother cell hypothesis still so widely rejected in neuroscience, and 
what are the theoretical confusions between disciplines?  In an attempt to address these 
questions I thought it would be useful to first explain why I (a cognitive psychologist) 
became interested in grandmother cells in the first place, and briefly summarize some points 
of disagreement between myself and others.  I hope this is an effective (rather than self-
indulgent) way to explain to neuroscientists what psychologists are talking about when 
contrasting localist and distributed theories and why this has some bearing on the 
grandmother vs. distributed contrast in neuroscience.  At the same time, I hope this helps 
clarify for psychologists the relevance of neuroscience to the localist vs distributed debate.   
This then provides the context for a brief review of single-unit recording studies in 
artificial neural networks.  As far as I am aware, no one has reviewed this literature 
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previously (in contrast to the multiple reviews of single-cell recording studies in brain), but 
the findings may provide some important insights into why some neurons respond highly 
selectively.  Finally, I conclude by providing a brief summary of the excellent set of 
contributions to this special issue from leading theorists in psychology and neuroscience.  
Although some of the contributors reject grandmother cells outright (Rolls) or challenge their 
functional relevance (Thomas and French), most of the contributors take grandmother cells as 
a serious hypothesis about how the brain codes for information.  Together, the chapters 
provide much needed discussion regarding how grandmother cells theories should be 
considered in neuroscience and psychology.    
Why (some) cognitive psychologists take localist representations seriously, and why this 
should matter to neuroscientists. 
  As a cognitive psychologist I am interested in modeling complex behavior at an 
algorithmic level that describe the processes that are involved in solving a given task 
(specifying how a problem is solved), but do not consider in any detail how the processes are 
implemented in the brain.  Bayesian theories of mind within psychology are often further 
removed from neuroscience, as these theories tend to be developed at a computational level 
of analysis that specify the goals and problems that people face with little consideration 
algorithmic, let alone the neural, underpinnings of behavior (Bowers & Davis, 2012).   
Nevertheless, most cognitive psychologists (including most Bayesian theorists) agree that a 
cognitive model should be consistent with what we know about the brain, and it is considered 
an advantage when a model has clear links to neuroscience.  Indeed, this is one of the main 
motivations for connectionist networks that provide an intuitive link between artificial units 
and connections on the one hand, and neurons and synapses on the other.   
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It is in this context that I often found conversations with students and colleague on the 
topic of localist vs. PDP models in psychology quite frustrating.  Localist models have a long 
history in psychology, and they often provide the best account of behavior across a range of 
domains.  But when discussing the relative merits of these two approaches I found the 
successes of localist models did not seem to carry much weight, and the reason was always 
the same:  Localist model were assumed to be biologically implausible.  If a localist model 
did a better job, it was not a sign that localist models should be taken seriously, but rather, 
that distributed PDP models need to improve. 
To illustrate this perspective, here is a passage from Seidenberg and Plaut (2006) in the 
context of comparing localist and distributed processing models of visual word identification 
(although they apply same arguments to all domains of cognition).  The authors note that 
localist models often account for more empirical findings than PDP models, but nevertheless, 
this is not considered key for evaluating the two approaches.  They write: 
“The dual-route and PDP approaches to understanding word reading are both 
supported by explicit computational simulations, but the role that these 
simulations play in theory development in the two cases is strikingly different. 
The DRC model of Coltheart et al. (2001) continues the long tradition of a 
bottom-up, data-driven approach to modelling: A model is designed to account 
for specific behavioural findings, and its match to those findings is the sole 
basis for evaluating it. These models aspire to what Chomsky (1965) called 
“descriptive adequacy”. The PDP approach is different. The models are only a 
means to an end. The goal is a theory that explains behaviour (such as reading) 
and its brain bases. The models are a tool for developing and exploring the 
implications of a set of hypotheses concerning the neural basis of cognitive 
processing. Models are judged not only with respect to their ability to account 
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for robust findings in a particular domain but also with respect to 
considerations that extend well beyond any single domain. These include the 
extent to which the same underlying computational principles apply across 
domains, the extent to which these principles can unify phenomena previously 
thought to be governed by different principles, the ability of the models to 
explain how behaviour might arise from a neurophysiological substrate, and so 
on. The models (and the theories they imperfectly instantiate) aspire to what 
Chomsky termed “explanatory adequacy”. The deeper explanatory force 
derives from the fact that the architecture, learning, and processing mechanisms 
are independently motivated (as by facts about the brain) rather than introduced 
in response to particular phenomena.” 
Although I agree with the authors that a range of criteria are relevant to assessing the 
merits of a specific model or modelling approach, there are reasons to questions their 
conclusions regarding the advantages of the PDP approach.  First, although they claim that 
PDP models provide a more general and principled explanation of a wide variety of 
phenomena, they ignore powerful localist modelling frameworks.  For example, the theories 
of Grossberg and colleagues provide a general set of learning and computational principles 
that apply across a wide range of cognitive and behavioural domain in a biologically 
plausible manner.  Localist representations have played a central role in in his models (see 
Grossberg, this issue).  Accordingly, there is little reason to assert that the PDP approach has 
privileged access to explanatory adequacy.  Second, and most importantly for present 
purposes, the claim (common in the literature) that distributed codes in PDP models are more 
biologically plausible is asserted without evidence.   Nevertheless, this claim, more than 
anything else, dominated my conversations regarding the relative merits of these two 
approaches.  
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This lead to the Bowers (2009) paper where I provided a detailed review of single-cell 
neurophysiology that characterized the responses of single neurons in a range of species 
performing a variety of tasks, and where I related the findings to the predictions of localist 
and distributed models developed in psychology.  The striking finding from neuroscience 
literature is that great deal of much information can be retrieved from the firing of single 
neurons, as nicely captured in this quote from over 20 years ago: 
Over the past 50 years, there has been an astonishing change in how we 
regard cells in the CNS, and especially, in the cortex. At the beginning of 
this period, it was believed that there was such an incredibly large number 
of such cells (105/mm3 of cortex, and more than 1010 altogether) that it 
would be absurd and meaningless to consider the role of a single one, and 
therefore averaging the activity of large numbers of them was the only 
sensible approach. Now it is possible to record from a single neuron in the 
cortex of an awake, behaving monkey, determine how well it performs in 
its task of pattern recognition, and compare this performance to that 
revealed by the behavioral responses of the same animal. The fact that 
thresholds are comparable (Britten et al., 1992) would have astounded the 
cortical neurophysiologist of 50 years ago. (Barlow, 1995, p. 417) 
Based on the review of the data, and a consideration of how localist representations in 
cognitive models function, I concluded that the neuroscience does not falsify localist models 
in psychology. 
 A follow-up debate between myself and proponents of distributed theories within both 
psychology (Plaut & McClelland, 2010) and neuroscience (Quian Quiroga & Kreiman, 2010) 
was useful in highlighting some of the disagreements and confusions regarding the term 
grandmother cell (mirroring a similar debate in response to Page, 2000).  On some definitions 
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grandmother cells are clearly untenable.  For example, if grandmother cell theories are 
committed to the claim that there is a single neuron associated with each unique experience 
(e.g., a single neuron coding for my grandmother knitting by the fireplace), with grandmother 
cells selectively responding to one input and not responding above baseline to anything else, 
with only one neuron per experience (no redundancy), then indeed, this is an implausible 
theory that is falsified by the data.  This characterization of grandmother cells is widespread 
in neuroscience (see Rolls, this issue).  But on less extreme definitions (e.g., units that code 
for familiar categories rather than all possible experiences), there is some room for 
disagreement, and indeed, a small group of theorists have at least considered grandmother 
cells as a serious hypothesis that should not be dismissed out of hand (e.g., Barlow, 1972; 
Bowers, 2002; Elliott & Susswein, 2002; Gross, 2002; Newsome, Britten, Movshon, 1989, 
Page, 2000; Perrett et al., 1989; Thorpe, 1989). 
 In Bowers (2009, 2010) I suggested that grandmother cells should be defined as 
localist representations as used in psychology; that is, units that represent one thing but are 
activated by related things.  For example, in the Interactive Activation (IA) model 
(McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981), a localist representation for the word DOG is activated 
most strongly by the input DOG, but it is also activated (to a lesser extent) by the visually 
similar words such as HOG and LOG by virtue of their shared letters (for more detail, see 
Michele et al., this issue).  Apart from having a much more precise definition, the benefit of 
defining grandmother cells as localist representations is that it adopts a common terminology 
across disciplines that should help avoid confusions (e.g., making it clear rejecting the 
extreme version of grandmother cells has no bearing on theory in psychology), it makes the 
neuroscience relevant to assessing theory in psychology, and it makes the large and 
sophisticated modelling tradition in psychology relevant to understanding the response 
properties of neurons.  Of course, it is far from clear that brains rely on localist 
GRANDMOTHER CELLS                                                                          9 
 
representations, but it is question worth asking (unlike the extreme grandmother cell theory 
that no one has ever endorsed and that Rolls, this issue, rightly rejects).  
Since 2010 there have been many high-profile reports of neurons responding to high-
level information in a highly selective manner in humans (largely in the hippocampus and 
related structures; e.g., Ison, Mormann, Cerf, Koch, Fried, Quian Quiroga, 2011; Ison, Quian 
Quiroga., & Fried, 2015; Rey et al., 2015), and multiple review articles on single-cell 
recording studies (Quian Quiroga, 2012, 2016; Quian Quiroga, Fried., & Koch, 2013; Yuste, 
2015; Roy, 2012, 2015).  Rather than provide another review of the neuroscience, I thought it 
would be more useful to provide a brief review studies reporting highly selective units in 
PDP models and so-called “deep” networks that have recently been the focus of so much 
attention in computer science.  This later work has been carried out with little consideration 
of how the results relate to theory in psychology and neuroscience, but I would argue that the 
findings are also relevant to the current issue.   
Brief review of single-unit recording in artificial neural networks: 
Single-unit recordings in artificial neural networks have been explored in both 
psychology and computer science, and although similar results have been reported, the 
amount of interest and attention to the work in the two fields is very different.  I briefly 
review the two literatures next. 
Single-unit recordings of PDP models in the psychological literature:  Although 
PDP networks have been popular in psychology since the mid-1980s, few single-unit 
recordings have been carried out.  Given that it is a far easier task to probe units in PDP 
models compared to real brains (where single-neural coding has been an active field since the 
1950s), and given our limited understanding how PDP models work (McCloskey, 1991) an 
obvious question is why?  And I think the answer is simple: most researchers studying 
connectionist networks in psychology have assumed that the learned representations are 
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distributed with the activations of single units meaningless.  As Mozer and Smolensky (1989, 
p. 3) put it:  
“... one thing that connectionist networks have in common with brains is that 
if you open them up and peer inside, all you can see is a big pile of goo.” 
The term “sub-symbolic” (Smolensky, 1988) was commonly used to highlight that individual 
units cannot be interpreted by themselves, and this was considered a major break from 
previous theorizing, and key to understanding how cognition is implemented in brain.  This 
continues to be the mainstream view of PDP modelers.  For example, in a recent review of 
PDP modelling, Rogers and McClelland (2014) wrote: 
… a percept of a visual input is assumed to be represented as a pattern of 
activation distributed over many neurons in several different brain areas, and each 
neuron is thought to participate in the representation of many different items. This 
representational scheme is held to apply to essentially all kinds of cognitive 
content: Words, letters, phonemes, grammatical structures; visual features, colors, 
structural descriptions of objects; semantic, conceptual, and schema 
representations; contents of working memory and contextual information 
affecting processing of current inputs; speech plans, motor plans, and more 
abstract action plans— all are thought to take the form of distributed patterns of 
activation over large neural populations. 
But despite these strong claims, there have been very few attempts to directly test this 
assumption by carrying out single-unit recording studies. 
As far as I am aware, the first attempt to carry out a single-cell recording study 
analogous to single-cell recordings in the brain was reported by Berkeley, Dawson, Medler, 
Schopflocher, and Hornsby (1995).  They trained simple three-layered networks via back-
propagation on a variety of tasks, including a logical reasoning task that had previously been 
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simulated by Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991), and the “kinship problem” problem studied by 
Hinton (1986).  The model they focused on was trained on the logical problem and it 
included 14 input units (a pattern of activation across these units defined the input problem, 
with pairs of input units coding for the individual components of a logical problem, such as 
OR, AND, IF-THEN, etc.), 3 output units (a pattern of activation across these units 
categorized the input problem into one of four different argument types and indicated 
whether or not the argument was valid), and 10 hidden units. The key point for present 
purposes is that after training, the model was able to correctly categorize 576 input patterns 
(logical statements) into six categories. 
After training they recorded the response of each hidden unit to a range of inputs 
using a scatter plot for each unit. The unit’s response to a specific input was coded with a 
point along the x-axis, with values on the y-axis arbitrary (y-axis is included in order to 
prevent points from overlapping). These so-called “jittered density plots” are roughly 
analogous to the raster plots used to measure the firing patterns of neurons to different stimuli 
(for an example of a jittered density plot, see Vankov and Bowers, this issue).  The critical 
finding was that the scatter plots often took on a “banding” patterns, in which multiple 
different inputs (different logical problems) drove a hidden unit to the same level of 
activation.  In some cases, the banding was consistent with localist coding.  For example, 
hidden unit 6 in their model responded strongly to all logical problems that included the 
“OR” feature, and not at all to other inputs. This is analogous to a neuron that responded to 
all images of Jennifer Aniston but not to other faces.  Accordingly, unit 6 appears to 
constitute a localist representation for the input OR.   
In subsequent work, Dawson and Piercy (2001) and Berkeley (2006) carried out 
lesion studies on the units from the original Berkeley et al. (1995) network, and in some 
cases, the units functioned like localist units.  For example, after removing unit 6, the model 
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performed well on problems that did not involve OR, and catastrophically failed (0%) on all 
problems that included the OR feature.  Although the authors disagreed somewhat on how to 
characterize the units, the findings clearly show how single units respond highly selectively 
to inputs, and that removing single units can have selective impairment on performance (just 
the opposite of so-called “graceful degradation” in which lesions to single units results in a 
small overall decrement in performance across many items, a pattern of result predicted from 
distributed theories).   
Similar banding patterns were obtained in other tasks and network designs.  Leighton 
and Dawson (2001) reported banding in a PDP model trained on the Wason’s card selection 
task that involves training a network a conditional rule (of the form of ‘If P then Q’) using a 
similar network to Berkeley et al. (1995).  Berkeley, and Gunay (2004) found banding 
patterns when they used a standard sigmoid activation function in their network in contrast 
with the ‘value units’ they had used in previous work. Originally, Berkeley et al. (1995) had 
claimed that this banding pattern was restricted to networks with a specific type of activation 
function.  Further evidence that this pattern of results is quite general was reported by 
Niklasson and Boden (1997) who reported banding patterns in a different sort of network that 
used a sigmoid activation function to map a set of inputs into 6 different categories.  
It should be noted that in many cases (indeed most cases) the units the networks 
reported by Berkeley and colleagues learned more than two bands, such that a given unit 
responded selectively to more than one thing.  For example, a unit might activate .5 (out of a 
maximum of 1.0) to the input feature OR and 1.0 to the AND input feature, and not at all to 
other inputs (resulting in 3 bands).  This is an interesting case in which the unit has properties 
of both localist and distributed coding.  That is, it is possible to interpret what the unit is 
responding to (if the unit is activated .5 then the OR unit is present), but the unit is involved 
in coding multiple things.  This is perhaps reminiscent of what has been called a “totem pole” 
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neurons (Malach, 2012).  But the most relevant units for present consideration are the units 
that contain two bands, and that selectively responded to one input, as did hidden unit 6 in 
Berkeley et al. (1995). 
More recently, my colleagues and I have used these scatter jitter plots to characterize 
the representations learned in larger recurrent neural networks that co-activate multiple items 
at the same time in short-term memory (STM).  Our work was inspired by earlier work of 
Botvinick and Plaut (2006) who developed a recurrent PDP model of immediate serial recall 
that was trained to encode a series of letters and then recall them back in the same order (e.g., 
given the sequence A, F, Q, recall A, F, Q).  The authors claimed that the model succeeded 
by co-activating multiple distributed patterns of letters in the hidden layer.  We found this 
conclusion surprising as it appeared to challenge the claim that distributed codes are poorly 
suited for co-activating multiple items at the same time, due to the superposition catastrophe 
(Von der Malsburg, 1986).  Indeed, the superposition catastrophe has provided a 
computational reason for learning localist codes in cortex (Bowers, 2002; Page, 2000), just as 
catastrophic interference provided a pressure to learn selective and sparse codes in the 
hippocampus (Marr, 1971).  If indeed the Botvinick and Plaut (2006) model supports STM 
through the co-activation of multiple overlapping distributed patterns, it would undermine 
this argument.   
However, we found that recurrent PDP networks that were successful in co-activating 
multiple items at the same time learned many localist codes (units with two bands), with the 
number of local codes increasing when the superposition constraint became more difficult 
(Bowers, Damian, Vankov, Davis, 2012; Bowers et al., 2014).  Furthermore, we found that 
recurrent PDP models of immediate serial recall could only generalize to novel items (e.g., 
recalling a sequence of novel words) when they learned localist representations (of letters).  
That is, we found that localist codes were better able to support generalization, just the 
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opposite to what is typically claimed.  We also found that lesioning learned localist units in 
these networks often led to highly specific deficits in performance.  For example, after 
deleting unit 152 (out of a total of 200 units) that selectively responding to the letter ‘J’, we 
presented the model with 1000 words (all composed of 3 letters), of which 100 contained the 
letter ‘J’.  The model was 99% in recalling words that did not contain the letter ‘J’, and failed 
100% of the time on words that did contain the letter ‘J’.  (See Table 1 from Bowers et al., 
2016.)  This nicely parallels the results of Berkeley (2006) who found highly selective 
deficits following the lesioning of single local units. 
In Vankov and Bowers (this issue) we explored the impact of arbitrary input-output 
mappings on the nature of the learned representations in PDP networks.  As detailed below, 
we found that PDP models succeeded on the basis of learned distributed representations in 
most conditions, but networks did learn localist representations in some conditions even 
though the model was trained on items one-at-a-time. We concluded that the superposition 
constraint provided a stronger pressure to learn localist representations that arbitrary input-
output mappings, but that the superposition constraint is not the only pressure to learn localist 
codes. 
As far as I am aware, these are the only single-unit recording studies carried out on 
PDP networks within the psychological literature.  Nevertheless, a number of conclusions 
seem justified, including that PDP models sometimes learn localist codes, and that learned 
localist representations in PDP models have functional value (such that removing localist 
units has specific predicted consequences).  These findings also suggest hypotheses about 
when (and why) neurons in cortex (as opposed to hippocampus) respond selectively.  For 
example, selective responding might be expected in cortical systems that generalize and 
support short-term memory (Bowers et al., 2016). 
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 Single-unit recording of deep networks in computer science: In contrast with the 
limited number of studies in psychology, there has been an explosion of single-unit recording 
studies in the computer science literature when applied to “deep” networks.  This has 
followed the extraordinary success of these networks in solving a challenging range of 
complex tasks, including state-of-the-art speech (Hannun et al., 2014) and image 
(Krizhevsky, et al., 2012) recognition, and even game playing (Mnih et al., 2015).  Deep 
networks are now being used in a wide range of applied settings, and companies are investing 
billions of pounds in developing deep networks because their enormous promise.    
 Two features of these networks are worth noting for present purposes.  First, they are 
not so different from the early PDP networks developed in the 1980s.  Although there have 
been some innovations to improve their performance, by the most important difference is 
that: a) computers with graphic cards can be trained many thousand times more quickly, and 
b) there are now much larger datasets of labeled data that are needed for supervised learning 
(cf., Ciresan, Meier, Gambardella, & Schmidhuber, 2010).  This allows massive networks 
(sometimes up to 1 billion connections over multiple layers) to be trained on massive datasets 
(e.g., Le et al., 2013).   
 Second, as is the case with PDP networks, there is relatively little understanding how 
or why these networks perform as well as they do.  Indeed, this has been the prime 
motivation carrying out single-unit recordings in deep networks.  But unlike the single-unit 
recording studies carried out in psychology or neuroscience, the main goal of these single-
unit studies has been to improve the performance of the networks, with little consideration of 
how the findings relate to theory in psychology or neuroscience.  Nevertheless, this work may 
also be relevant to theory in the same way simple PDP networks are; namely, insights into 
when and why these large networks learn selective codes may provide hypotheses as to why 
some neurons respond in a highly selective manner. 
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One approach to single-unit recording in computer science is broadly similar to the 
single-unit recordings in psychology (and neuroscience).  That is, the activation of single-
units is recorded in response to many different meaningful inputs in an attempt to determine 
whether a consistent set of inputs (e.g., images of specific objects) drive the unit. Yosinski, 
Clune, Nguyen, Fuchs, and Lipson (2015) call this the “data-centric” approach to 
characterizing the function of individual units.  Once again, localist representations were 
discovered across a range of different types of networks and across a range of different tasks.  
For example, Le et al. (2013) observed localist codes in a “deep belief” network that learned 
a localist representation of a face without supervision, whereas other researchers have 
reported localist representations in deep convolutional networks trained with supervised 
learning methods (Agrawal, Girshick, & Malik, 2014; Li, Yosinski, Clune, Pipson, Hopcroft, 
2015; Zeiler, & Fergus, 2014; Zhou, Khosla, Lapedriza, Oliva, & Torralba, 2015).  And in 
these later networks, localist coding was observed across a range of training conditions.  For 
example, Zhou et al. (2015) carried out single-unit recordings when the same network was 
trained on two different tasks.  In one condition, a convolutional network was trained to 
categorize 1.3 million images into 1000 different object categories, and in other, the same 
model was trained to categorize 2.4 million images into 205 scene categories.  They found 
localist codes in both cases, but surprisingly, found more localist codes for objects in the later 
case even though the model was not trained on objects (objects were diagnostic of scene 
categories, which made learning localist codes for the objects relevant to task performance).  
In other work, Li et al. (2015) reported highly overlapping set of learned localist codes when 
the same networks were given different random initializations of weights, again showing the 
generality of the findings.  
A second and more popular approach to characterizing single units in deep network is 
called ‘network centric’ (Yosinski et al., 2014) and uses a process called activation 
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maximization.  On this method, rather than present a set of meaningful images to a network 
and measure how individual units respond, the experimenter generates images that best drives 
the units.  For instance, a random pattern (noise) might be presented to a network, and then 
input is systematically varied (though various algorithms) in order to generate images that 
drive a unit more strongly.  If meaningful images are generated in this way it suggests that the 
unit selectively codes for this high-level visual information (Erhan, Bengio, Courville, 
Vincent, 2009; Le et al., 2013; Mahendran &  Vedaldi, 2016; Nguyen, Dosovitskiy, Yosinski, 
Brox, & Clune, 2016; Nguyen, Yosinski, & Clune, 2015, 2016;  Simonyan, Vedaldi, & 
Zisserman, 2014; Wei, Zhou, Torrabla, & Freeman, 2015; Yosinski et al., 2015).  
Initial attempts at activation maximization suggested individual units code for 
information in a distributed manner given that the images that maximally drove individual 
units did not correspond to interpretable inputs (Simonyan et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015; 
Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014).  Indeed, in some cases, deep networks would 
confidently categorize noise as a familiar category (e.g. labeling with near certainty that 
images that look like TV static – to humans – as a robin; Nguyen et al., 2015).  This is not 
what one should expect from a grandmother unit.  See Figure 2. 
However, when various constraints on how images are generated are introduced so 
that the synthetic images share the general structure of natural images, then highly 
interpretable images emerge (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2015, 2016; Yosinski et al., 2015).  For 
example, Yosinski et al. (2015) introduced a penalty for generating high contrast images 
(adjacent pixels that had very different values), and penalized images with pixels with large 
values (such that any new images included less “bright” regions), and penalized pixels with 
low values (such that any new images tended to have no activation in these regions).  Note, 
none of constraints were designed to produce meaningful patterns, they just insured that the 
images that were generated shared some basic properties with natural images (e.g., objects in 
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the world tend to have similar levels of illumination at adjacent locations). Nevertheless 
strikingly meaningful patterns emerged, as seen in Figure 3.  These are just the sort of images 
that would be expected on a grandmother theory of neural representation.  Again, these 
interpretable images have been observed across a range of networks (convolutional networks 
as well as deep belief networks without any supervision) and under a range of training 
conditions.  The learned representations revealed through activation maximization have been 
compared to grandmother cells (Le et al., 2013). 
Although activation maximization techniques provide striking demonstrations that 
units respond selectively to meaningful inputs (e.g., images of rocking chairs) the fact that 
these same units also respond to very different patterns (that look like TV static) complicate 
the interpretation of the units.  In some ways this parallels Waydo et al. (2006) analysis of the 
single-cell recording data collected by Quian Quiroga et al. (2005). Waydo et al. argued that 
even the most selective neurons (e.g., the Jennifer Aniston neuron) would respond to other 
categories of (untested) objects.  Indeed, Waydo et al. estimated that if the experimenter 
could present all familiar categories of objects to the patient with the Jennifer Aniston neuron 
(images of all familiar people, places, and things), then between 50-150 other familiar items 
would drive this neuron.  This reasoning lead the Waydo et al. (2006) to reject grandmother 
cells in favor of what they called sparse distributed coding (also see Quian Quiroga, Kreiman, 
Koch, & Fried, 2008).  In the same way, a “data-centric” analysis of a deep network 
(analogues to single-cell recording studies) often reveal units that responds highly selectively 
to one category of object (e.g., images of motorcycles), but the activation maximization 
method shows that this same unit will respond to other images, just images that are unlikely 
to be tested (such as a specific image that looks like TV static).  An interesting question is 
whether activation maximization findings support the conclusion that deep networks also 
learn sparse distributed rather than localist codes. 
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In fact, there is an important distinction that should be drawn between the Waydo et 
al. (2006) analysis of neural firing and the activation maximization findings observed in 
artificial networks.  That is, in the Waydo analysis, all the highly selective neurons observed 
in humans are expected to fire to other familiar objects.  It was just a limitation of time that 
prevented the experimenter from identifying the other relevant familiar objects that drive 
these neurons.  By contrast, both data-centric and activation maximization findings show that 
selective units in artificial networks often represent only one familiar category of object in the 
universe of trained objects, or indeed, represent one familiar category of object amongst all 
possible categories that respect the visual structure of the world.  It is only unfamiliar images 
that do not follow the statistical structure of the visual world that confuse these units.  Given 
that localist representations and grandmother cells are theories about how familiar objects are 
coded (Bowers, 2009), the observation that these selective units also respond to specific 
examples of noise does not seem so relevant.  In addition, as discussed below, Waydo et al.’s 
(2006) claim that selective neurons fire to multiple familiar objects is also consistent with 
localist coding schemes (see Gubian, Davis, Adelman, and Bowers, this issue).   
Still, what is to be made regarding the observation that selective units in deep 
networks often respond strongly to both one meaningful category as well as some specific 
images that look like meaningless noise?  One possible response is that the same may apply 
to humans.  Indeed, some researchers have advanced the argument that mistakenly 
identifying an unnatural image as familiar objects in a deep networks is analogous to other 
illusions that humans clearly do experience (e.g., Kriegeskorte, 2015).  It is just in practice 
difficult to find images that would fool humans in the same way that images confuse artificial 
networks.  It is important to note, however, that even if we accept this, it does not challenge 
the grandmother cell hypothesis.  For example, consider a cell that responds to one person 
amongst all known and unknown possible people (e.g., a unit that only responds to Jennifer 
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Aniston after testing the individual with all possible human faces) as well as some specific 
patterns of TV static. It seems reasonable to call this a grandmother cell given that it 
selectively codes for one familiar person, and it is very unlikely fire to anything else in the 
person’s lifetime. 
Another response to this finding is that it reflects a deep disconnect between how deep 
networks and the human visual system operate.  This in turn may lead to the conclusion that 
single-unit recordings from deep networks (or perhaps all artificial networks) are just too 
different to be meaningfully related to theory psychology and neuroscience.  This indeed is a 
serious concern (a concern more general than the localist/distributed issue, but of neural 
network modelling in general).  Another possible conclusion, however, is that the important 
differences between brains and deep networks do not undermine the more general inferences 
that can be drawn.  Indeed, a key feature of the PDP and deep neural networks above is that 
they rely on learning algorithms that are not designed to learn distributed or selective codes.  
Rather, the models learn the representations that are best suited for a given task.  As Plaut and 
McClelland (2000) put it, PDP networks “discover representations that are effective in 
solving tasks…” and this “provides more insight into why cognitive and neural systems are 
organized the way they are”. (p. 489).  On this logic (which I accept) the observation of 
localist coding in PDP networks across some but not all conditions may provide some insight 
into what sorts of problems are best solved by localist codes, with implications not only for 
PDP networks, but perhaps for real brains as well.   
Single unit recordings of alternative neural networks. I should also note that a 
number of alternative neural networks also learn highly selective representations, including 
Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) networks (e.g., Carpenter & Grossberg, 1986), and 
spiking neural network models that rely on spike timing dependent plasticity (Masquelier & 
Thorpe, 2007).  I will not consider these findings here because the networks include built-in 
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processes that contribute to the development of localist representations.  As a consequence, 
the models do no provide independent evidence that localist codes are the best suited for 
solving the problems they faced. 
It is worth noting, however, that the observation that PDP and deep networks often 
learn localist codes suggest that there are good reasons to build in processes that result in 
more selective coding.  It is also the case that ART and spiking neural network models that 
rely on spike timing dependent plasticity are more biologically plausible than the PDP and 
deep networks described earlier.  Furthermore, the learned localist representations in these 
networks are crucial to the functioning of these models, including the capacity of these 
networks to learn quickly without suffering forgetting – the stability-plasticity dilemma 
(Grossberg, 1980).  So these models again highlight the biologically plausibility of 
grandmother cells. 
Conclusions from simulation studies: 
In summary, the single unit recording studies carried out on PDP networks within 
psychology and on deep networks within computer science have different motivations, but 
both sets of results demonstrate that single units respond highly selectively to meaningful 
inputs.  Unlike in neuroscience it is possible to more systematically explore a vast number of 
images of familiar objects, persons, and scenes, and indeed, explore the space of possible 
images, in order to get a better idea of what single units represent.  It is clear that single units 
sometimes selectively represent meaningful categories when tested against the universe of 
familiar, as well as unfamiliar but possible items.  The ubiquity of localist coding across all 
these networks and conditions should give pause to cognitive psychologists and 
neuroscientist who dismiss localist coding (or grandmother cells) as implausible, and suggest 
reasons as to why brains may adopt similar strategies. 
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Summary of Chapters 
Given the recent excitement regarding the high selectivity of single-cells in 
hippocampus and cortex, and the recent explosion of research showing selective codes 
emerge in artificial neural networks, it is a good time to explore the thoughts of leading 
theorists in psychology and neuroscience on the controversial topic of localist and 
grandmother cell representations.   I’m very pleased that so many authors focused on 
terminological issues that have led to so much confusion in the literature.   
I’ve organized the contributions as follows. I start with theorists that have emphasized 
a neuroscience perspective (Krieman; Riesenhuber & Glezer; Grossberg; and Rolls), 
followed by psychologists associated with the PDP perspective (Rodny, Shea, & Kello; and 
Thomas & French), followed by psychologists associated with the localist perspective 
(Coltheart; Hummel; Page; Gubian, Davis, Adelman, & Bowers; and Vankov & Bowers).  
Some of the assignments of people to research areas are a bit arbitrary and could have been 
assigned differently, but in any case, together, the articles provide an excellent summary of 
thinking on this topic from a range of perspectives. 
Neuroscience perspective:   
  Krieman:  Krieman describes 10 characteristics of neural representations (whether 
localist or distributed), and then summarizes a range of findings in visual and non-visual 
systems in order characterize representations as localist or distributed.  His conclusion is that 
grandmother representations are found throughout the brain, from low-level visual systems 
(retinal ganglion cells) to high-level visual system (inferotemporal cortex), as well as 
memory systems (hippocampus) and systems involved in interpreting inputs and decision 
making (frontal cortex).  In his words, “grandmothers galore”.  For example, Krieman 
characterizes simple cells that respond maximally to line segments at a given angle at 
different locations as grandmother cells.  He also emphasizes that these grandmother simple 
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cells pool to grandmother complex cells, and argues that a collection simple cells constitute a 
distributed representations of the more complex information coded in complex cells.  The 
claim that co-active local representations at one level of a system are also part of a distributed 
representation at another level is common (Hummel, this issue; Page, this issue; Plaut & 
McClelland, 2010).1  
One point I would like to emphasize here is that Kreiman is adopting the view that 
grandmother cells in neuroscience are similar to localist codes in psychology.  It is striking 
how this helps clarify issues between psychology and neuroscience.  In their commentary of 
Bowers (2009) paper, Quian Quiroga and Kreiman (2010) were critical of my claim that 
grandmother cells are biologically plausible, but the disagreements between Kreiman and 
myself are largely resolved in this contribution, and I think this largely reflects using the 
same terminology rather than fundamental change of position. 
Riesenhuber and Glezer:  Riesenhumber and Glezer describes new analyses from a 
previous study (Glezer, Jiang, & Riesenhuber, 2009) that employed the fMRI rapid 
                                                     
1 By contrast, I have argued that a collection of local codes that map onto more complex 
(local) code does not constitute a distributed code.  For example, I disagree that co-activating 
the letter representations D-O-G in the IA model constitutes a distributed representation of 
the word DOG given that the co-active letter codes do not encode the fact that DOG is a word 
(it only encodes the fact that three letters are co-active; for more detail, see Bowers, 2009, 
2010). Although there is clearly disagreement about what constitutes a localist vs. distributed 
representation (even amongst advocates of localist coding), one thing should be clear; 
namely, the co-activation of multiple localist codes is very different from the distributed 
representations proposed by proponents of PDP models.  According to PDP theorists, all 
cognitive content, including letters, is coded in a distributed manner in which each unit is 
involved in coding multiple things (see above quote by Rogers and McClelland, 2014).  So if 
the a collection of simple grandmother cells in V1 or localist letter detectors in the IA model 
are described as part of a distributed representation that map onto higher levels of 
representations (e.g., the collection of localist letter codes D-O-G constitute a distributed 
representation of the word DOG), it is important to distinguish between distributed 
representation composed of meaningful localist units and distributed representations 
composed in meaningless units.  Hummel (this issue) calls the latter form of representation 
“deep distributed”.   
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adaptation technique (fMRI-RA) to examine the nature word representations in the visual 
word form area (VWFA).  In the previous study the authors reported data suggesting that the 
VWFA contained neurons tuned to whole words (localist representation) rather than pre-
lexical letter combinations, and they took their findings to be consistent with localist models 
of reading.  In the present study, the Riesenhumber and Glezer reanalyzed the Glezer et al. 
(2009) results to see how quickly localist representations develop for newly learned words 
(novel words were repeated in this study).  The striking finding was that they obtained 
evidence for newly acquired localist word representations in the VWFA following just 5-6 
exposures in a single day. 
The evidence for newly acquired localist representations in the VWFA following a 
few representations is theoretically significant because it is commonly argued that 
consolidation, a time consuming processes, is necessary before new information is added to 
the cortex.  Indeed, according the complementary learning systems hypothesis, information is 
coded in a highly selective (although not localist) manner in the hippocampus, and that this 
information is slowly transferred to the cortex in a more distributed manner (McClelland et 
al., 1995).  This novel finding poses a challenge to this theatrical approach, and indeed, adds 
to the arguments put forward Page (this issue) against the complementary learning systems 
hypothesis.   
Grossberg:  Grossberg provides a summary of his modelling approach, with specific 
emphasis on visual object identification and how sequences of items can be stored in short-
term memory. Grossberg also supports the hypothesis that there are multiple levels of 
grandmother cells, and that co-active grandmother cells at a lower level of a hierarchy 
constitute a distributed representation for higher level knowledge (like Krieman and others). 
However he also introduces another term that I think is quite apt, namely, a “grandmother 
cohort”.  As I detailed in Footnote 1, it is important to distinguish between the view that all 
GRANDMOTHER CELLS                                                                          25 
 
units are meaningless when considered in isolation (the standard definition of distributed 
coding in PDP modelling; see Rogers & McClelland, 2014) and a collection of meaningful 
units that map onto more complex localist representation.  The term Grandmother cohort 
captures the former position quite elegantly I think. 
Grossberg also makes an important distinction between localist representations that 
code for specific categories (Grandma Leitner!) and more abstract ones (e.g., a generic 
person).  He notes that ART can accommodate both forms of localist coding, and that a 
vigilance parameter in his model determines the granularity of learned localist representation 
(the issue of specificity of grandmother cells is a central point of the Coltheart contribution, 
discussed briefly below).   In addition, he notes that the dynamics of the competitive 
processes in his network can vary, with winner-take-all dynamics (typical in most of his 
modelling) or less severe competition that lead to distributed coding (e.g., Carpenter, 1997).  
Accordingly, in addition to grandmother cells and grandmother cohorts, more traditional 
forms of distributed coding can also develop in his networks.   
Rolls.  In contrast with the above authors, Rolls is critical of grandmother cell 
theories.  According to Rolls, grandmother cell theory is committed to the view that each 
visual experience is coded by a single neuron that does not fire to anything else.  He 
dismisses this view because there are not enough neurons (or synapses) to code for all the 
possible visual experiences, because it is implausible to suggest that a lesion of a single 
neuron would lead to the selective loss of knowledge, and because grandmother cells cannot 
generalize.  Rolls also reviews a number of single-cell recording studies that he takes as 
inconsistent with grandmother cells.  For example, he describes a study by Rolls and Tovee 
(1995) in which the authors reported the responses of 14 neurons in the superior temporal 
sulcus in 2 monkeys in response to 68 stimuli (23 face and 45 nonface).  The critical finding 
was that the average sparseness was 0.65 (meaning that the average neuron responded to 65% 
GRANDMOTHER CELLS                                                                          26 
 
of the images2).  Rolls also notes that neuron firing is probably much more selective than this 
once correcting the spontaneous firing of the 14 neurons and given that the .65 value is based 
only on the neurons that responded to one or more of the images.  As Rolls (this issue) write:  
“There were many more neurons that had no response to the stimuli. At least 10 
times the number of inferior temporal cortex neurons had no responses to this set 
of 68 stimuli. So the true sparseness would be much lower…”.    
Nevertheless, Rolls considers the results inconsistent with grandmother cell theories that 
predict much more selective responding (according to Rolls, a grandmother cell coding 
scheme would predict a selectivity value of 1/68 for these images). 
Another finding that Rolls takes to be inconsistent with grandmother cells is based on 
an analysis of the encoding of information by multiple cells (Rolls, Treves, & Tovee, 1997).  
On this analysis, grandmother cell theories predict that the number of stimuli that can be 
represented by a population of neurons rises approximately linearly with the number of 
neurons, whereas with distributed encoding, the number of stimuli that can be represented 
should rise exponentially.  The results of the Rolls et al. (1997) study is claimed to support 
the predictions of distributed coding and to be inconsistent with grandmother cell theories. 
However, it is important to note that these analysis are only relevant to falsifying the 
extreme version of grandmother cells that Rolls describes.  As detailed by Gubian et al. (this 
issue) and Page (this issue), localist models can account for the levels of selectivity reported 
Waydo et al. (2006), and can explain the number of stimuli that can be represented and 
identified by a population of neurons.   
 
                                                     
2 As is common in the neuroscience literature, Rolls uses the term “sparseness” to measure the selectivity of a 
single neuron rather than as a measure of the proportion of neurons that fire in response to a single image.  
One of the common confusions in translating neuroscience to psychology is that the terms selectivity and 
sparseness are used differently in the different literatures (see Bowers 2011). 
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Theorists from psychology associated with the PDP perspective: 
It is unfortunate that many theorists associated with the PDP perspective declined to 
contribute, but I am pleased that Rodny, Shea, and Kello (this issue) as well as Thomas and 
French (this issue) have contributed.   Interestingly, the authors take very different views 
from one another as well as from all other contributors. 
Rodny, Shea, and Kello:  Rodny et al. challenge an assumption shared by theorists 
from both the localist and distributed perspectives, namely, that knowledge representations 
are stable over time (indeed, stability over time is one of the definitions of a representation 
provided by Kreiman, this issue).  The authors summarize evidence that “…representations 
continually shift and change, even on relatively fast timescales, and even after learning has 
stabilized”, and describe a spiking neural network that learns localist representations that 
change over a wide range of timescales.  This raises a new potential challenge for 
understanding the representations that support perception and cognition (a complication that 
applies to both localist and distributed theories), and it will be interesting to see future 
developments on this fundamental claim.  Most relevant to the current topic, it is interesting 
that the authors are endorsing a form of (transient) localist coding.  It is perhaps worth noting 
that although Kello is associated with the PDP framework, he has for some time been 
sympathetic to the view that knowledge is coded in a localist format (e.g., Kello, 2006). 
Thomas and French:  Unlike Kello, Thomas and French have been long-term critics 
of localist/grandmother schemes, and accordingly, it is interesting to note that Thomas and 
French do not reject the hypothesis that grandmother cells exist.  However, they do question 
whether these cells are functionally significant.  On their view, neuron that selectively 
responds to an image of a grandmother “have very little, or no impact on the actual 
recognition of my grandmother”.  They detail two scenarios in which grandmother cells 
might develop, but where distributed representations in fact do all the work.  On this view, 
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grandmother cells are not important topic to explore, and thus the title of their paper: 
“Grandmother cells: Much ado about nothing”. 
In support of this view, the authors note that there are no neuropsychological 
syndromes I which a patient fails to identify a particular person, and describe a study that 
found non-selective neurons played an important role in categorizing visual stimuli (Thomas, 
Van Hulle, & Vogels, 2002).  With regards to this later point, Thomas et al. (2002) used a 
Kohonen network to categorize the response of 219 neurons in the inferior temporal cortex of 
a monkey trained to categorize photographs as tree vs. non-trees (the neural responses were 
taken from Vogels, 1999).   The model was able use these signals as inputs in order to 
categorize the in inputs quite accurately (83%).  They then removed the inputs from neurons 
that where more or less selective (none of the neurons were completely selective), and found 
that the more selective neurons did not contribute more to the performance of the network.  
Indeed, they found that that the input from the less selective neurons was more critical in 
supporting performance.  They took these findings as evidence that the selective responses of 
neurons often reported in the literature are not functionally relevant, and the important 
computations are performed by distributed codes.  
Theorists from psychology supportive of localist coding: 
Coltheart:  Coltheart starts with a brief historical review of the concept of 
grandmother cells, dating back to a course taught at MIT by Jerome Lettvin in 1969, and then 
highlights many of the conceptual confusions regarding this hypothesis over the years.  Like 
other contributors to this issue, Coltheart emphasizes that the grandmother cell hypothesis is 
not committed to the claim neurons fire to one thing and nothing else, nor the idea that there 
is a single neuron with no redundancy.  But a novel point that Coltheart makes is that it is 
important to distinguish between grandmother cells and gnostic units.  On this view, 
grandmother cells selectively code for specific items (my grandmother’s face, my hand, that 
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dog), whereas gnostic units selectively code for general categories (grandmother faces in 
general, cars in general, dogs in general).   According to Coltheart, both types of 
representations are localist, but a failure to distinguish between levels of abstraction lead to 
confusions.  Indeed, according to Coltheart, the evidence for gnostic units is strong, but the 
evidence for grandmother cells within the visual system is weak. 
Note, there is no reason to think that qualitatively different processes need to be 
involved in learning and representing grandmother and gnostic units.  For example, 
Grossberg (this issue) also contrasted localist units that code for quite specific inputs 
(Grandma Leitner!) and more abstract representations (general or prototypical grandmother 
face), and argued that the different levels of abstraction can be explained with different 
setting of a vigilance parameter in ART models (so that both grandmother and gnostic units 
might be coded at the same level of the hierarchy of network).  Another possibility is that 
grandmother units are at level n-1 of a hierarchy that pool onto gnostic units at level n, such 
that grandmother units of JOHN, BILL, JANE, SUE, etc. all map onto a common generic 
representation of person.   
I agree with Coltheart that many single-cell recording studies in the visual system 
provide evidence for gnostic rather than grandmother units (e.g., neurons that respond to 
hands in general; e.g., Gross, Bender, & Roch-Miranda, 1969), but it should also be noted 
that highly selective responses to specific items have also been observed in cortex.  Perhaps 
one of the more striking examples was reported by Logothetis, Pauls, and Poggio (1995) who 
trained two rhesus monkeys to identify a large set of novel computer-generated objects that 
were highly similar to one another.  The most common selective response (by far) was to a 
specific object in a given orientation, with a smaller number of neurons responding to a given 
object across orientations (both types of representations would appear to be grandmother unit 
by Coltheart’s definition).  Bowers (2009) reviews a variety of additional results that would 
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seem more consistent with grandmother rather than gnostic units.  Nevertheless, it is a 
distinction worth making, and the distinction becomes all the more important if it turns out 
that future work shows that neurons in the cortex tend to respond selectively at the category 
level but not the item level. 
Hummel:  Hummel provides a detailed analysis of the defining attributes localist and 
distributed coding and their relative advantages. He notes the terms localist and distributed 
coding terms are only meaningful with respect to that which is being represented.  Every 
hidden unit in a distributed coding scheme will maximally fire to an input (or a set of inputs), 
but if the input(s) is meaningless, it does not constitute a localist code (just like you would 
not argue that a unit in a deep network that responds strongly to a noise that looks like TV 
static is a localist representation for this specific form of noise).  Localist codes represent 
meaningful things.  Hummel also contrasts “deeply distributed” representations in which all 
units are uninterpretable (the standard theoretical position of PDP modelers; see Rogers and 
McClelland, 2014, quote above), with distributed representations composed of a pattern of 
activation over localist units.  Again, I think it is a mistake to call co-active local codes a 
distributed representation, and much prefer Grossberg’s term ‘grandmother cohort’.  But 
“deeply distributed” seems an excellent term to describe the view that all cognitive content 
(e.g., letters, phonemes, words, objects, etc.) is coded in a distributed format. 
Hummel argues that both localist and distributed representations have their place, and 
their relative merits depend on the goals of the computation to be performed.  A key point 
that is not raised by any of the other contributors is that localist representations may be best 
suited for supporting symbolic computations.  The long-standing localist/distributed debate 
needs to be distinguished from the long-standing symbolic/non-symbolic debate, and indeed, 
localist models can be either be symbolic or non-symbolic.  For example, the Spatial Coding 
Model includes local symbolic letter codes (Davis, 2010) whereas the IA model of word 
GRANDMOTHER CELLS                                                                          31 
 
identification includes local but non-symbolic letter codes (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981).  
Although most models with localist representations do not support symbolic computation, 
Hummel argues that symbolic models require localist codes. 
Page:  Page makes two quite different points.  First, he challenges the common 
conclusion drawn from an influential study by Rolls and colleagues (Rolls, Treves, & Tovee, 
1997; repeated by Rolls, this issue).  As noted above, Rolls et al. (1997) recorded from 14 
neurons in superior temporal sulcus that responded more strongly to face compared to non-
face stimuli.  The critical observation was that the ability to identify a specific face from the 
pattern of neural responses was exponentially related to the number of neurons from which 
they measured, with more neural responses associated with better accuracy (single neurons 
did a poor job).  This was taken to be a signature of districted coding.  However, Page shows 
that a localist model of face identification can capture these data as well, and concludes that 
the findings cannot be used to support distributed compared to localist coding.  Whether the 
findings are inconsistent with grandmother cells (as claimed by Rolls, this issue) depends on 
how grandmother cells are defined. 
Second, Page describes some objections to the complementary learning hypothesis 
that is frequently used to explain why distributed representations are found in cortex (a topic 
also considered by Riesenhuber and Glezer this issue; Grossberg, this issue).  As noted by 
Page (also see Bowers et al., 2016) many of the original claims motivating the 
complementary learning systems no longer hold, including the claim that localist codes are 
poorly suited for generalization.  But Page raises a more fundamental objection, claiming 
there is a logical problem regarding how the interleaving learning of new patterns (from the 
hippocampus) and old patterns (already stored in the cortex) can be achieved by a system 
employing gradient-descent learning.  I look forward to future discussions on this topic. 
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Gubian, Davis, Adelman, and Bowers:  Gubian et al. adopt a similar approach to 
Page (this issue) in that they challenge the interpretation of an influential finding taken to 
falsify grandmother cells.  Quan Quiroga et al. (2005) reported neurons in the hippocampus 
and related structures that responded highly selectively to images of objects, persons, and 
places (e.g., the Jennifer Aniston neuron), and in a subsequent analysis of these results, 
Waydo et al. (2006) concluded that the average selectivity of these neurons was 
approximately .5%, meaning that these neurons responds to about .5% of presented images, 
and that each neuron responds to between 50-150 different categories of image.  These 
findings were taken as evidence in support of sparse distributed coding and inconsistent with 
grandmother cell coding. The key finding by Gubian et al. is that a localist model of visual 
word identification can also explain this level of selectivity, and accordingly, the findings 
should not be used to reject localist representations.  Again, whether these findings are 
inconsistent with grandmother cells depends, on how grandmother cells are defined.   
Vankov and Bowers:  Finally, Vankov and Bowers explored some of the factors that 
contribute to localist coding in simple feed-forward PDP models when items are trained one-
at-a-time.  As reviewed above, Bowers et al., (2014, 2016) found that recurrent PDP models 
learn localist representations when trained to co-activate multiple items at the same time in 
short-term memory, but learned distributed representations when trained on the same items 
one-at-time.  At the same time, a number of PDP and deep networks learn localist 
representations when trained on images one-at-a-time.  Why the different results?  We looked 
into whether learning arbitrary input-output mappings (characteristic of mappings learned the 
deep networks) provides a pressure to learn localist representations. 
Our main finding is the PDP models succeeded with arbitrary input-output mappings 
using distributed codes in many of the conditions we tested, but we did find localist codes 
under the conditions in which deep networks learn localist codes, namely, when learning to 
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map multiple images of an object (in this case faces) to a single output when the input units 
took on continuous rather than binary values.  Clearly these findings highlight that localist 
codes are adaptive in PDP networks under some conditions and not others, and future work is 
required to better characterize what exactly is the pressure to learn localist codes when 
processing items one-item-at-a-time.  Based on our results, it is clear that arbitrary input-
output mappings do not provide as strong a strong pressure to learn localist codes as does co-
activating multiple items at the same time  
Overall Summary: 
 The term ‘grandmother cell’ is often defined in different ways, and accordingly, it is 
not always clear what theories are challenged when a researcher rejects grandmother cells.  
What is clear is that there is a large literature in neuroscience highlighting the extreme 
selectivity of some neurons in cortex and hippocampus, and a growing literature of single-
unit recording studies in artificial neural networks that also report highly selective (localist) 
representations.  If grandmother cells are defined as localist representation in psychological 
models, then grandmother cells cannot be dismissed out of hand, and indeed, good arguments 
can be put forward in support of grandmother cells of this sort.  The articles in this special 
issue show that many researchers consider grandmother cells a serious hypothesis about how 
knowledge is coded, as well as highlight key disagreements and issues that need to be 
addressed in future work.  If nothing else, I hope this special issue contributes to a more 
productive debate on an important issue that has often been characterized by 
misunderstandings between disciplines. 
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Figure Captions: 
 
Figure 1:  Number of citations to "grandmother cell" or "grandmother cells" per year 
averaged over decades (according to Google Scholar). 
 
Figure 2:  Eight examples of noisy images that are confidently categorized as a familiar 
object.  Taken from Nguyen et al. (2015). 
 
Figure 3:  Synthesized images that best activate three different units from layer 8 of a deep 
convolutional network.  Four different examples of the best synthesized images for 
each unit is presented.  Clearly, these units are most activated by meaningful objects.  
Taken from Yosinski et al. (2015). 
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